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Abstract
Fertő, I., & Kovács, A. (2019). The hidden drivers of the legislation of the Common Agricultural Policy – the case 
of the 2013 CAP reform. Bulgarian Journal of Agricultural Science, 25(2), 223–231
For decades, the European Council took the dominant role in formulating the agricultural policy and legislation of the Eu-
ropean Union. Nevertheless, debate about the legislative inﬂ uence of the European Parliament has intensiﬁ ed with the gradual 
empowerment of the EP in the decision-making processes of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon represents a key milestone in this 
process as ordinary legislative procedure was through this treaty extended to cover the Common Agricultural Policy. This 
article investigates the legislative inﬂ uence of Members of the EP in the 2013 CAP reform using a novel dataset of EP amend-
ments. The article makes a threefold contribution. First, it applies structural equation modelling in the context of EU decision-
making and food policy legislation. Second, it adds to the European agricultural and food policy debate by investigating the 
underlying factors of legislative success through the creation of latent variables, which permit observation of the combined 
impact of similar variables. Third, it incorporates analysis of a number of new explanatory variables related to the Member 
States that MEPs represent, including agriculture-related variables. The weak ﬁ t of the predeﬁ ned, experience-based model 
suggests that the legislative outcomes of the 2013 CAP reform were inﬂ uenced by non-observable or non-measurable factors.
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy; European Parliament; co-decision (ordinary legislative procedure); struc-
tural equation modelling
Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the highest 
budget common policy in the EU since its establishment in 
1962. CAP also constitutes the backbone of food policy leg-
islation in the European Union. The entering into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 extended the scope of the co-
decision procedure to Common Agricultural Policy, which at-
tracted scientiﬁ c attention in light of the recent reform of CAP. 
Swinnen and Knops (2012) focus on the role of the EP in the 
co-decision procedure, while Greer and Hind (2012) concen-
trate on investigating the inter-institutional relations among 
the Commission, Parliament and the Council in the ﬁ eld of 
the CAP. They conﬁ rm that, even according to the co-decision 
procedure, the Council is the most powerful actor as concerns 
CAP legislation, and that the EP, although its legislative power 
has increased, is still not a real co-legislator. Other papers dis-
cussed the food policy implications of some key elements of 
the 2013 CAP reform, including “greening” (Erjavec and Er-
javec, 2015) and Single Farm Payments (Urban et al., 2016). 
The aim of this research is to analyse the factors that inﬂ u-
ence Common Agricultural Policy-related decision-making. 
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The paper contributes to international food policy debate by 
analysing the inﬂ uence and interrelatedness of observable 
and quantiﬁ able external and internal factors on food policy 
legislation in European Union. The paper helps get a better 
understanding of the role of European Parliament in agri-
cultural policy formulation and legislation. While signiﬁ cant 
previous research deals with analysing the policy outcomes 
of the 2013 CAP reform, research focusing on the decision-
making and legislative process of this reform is practically 
non-existent. There is a lot about “what”, but minimal about 
“how”. European food companies and farmers’ associations 
as well as Member States and EP Groups could potentially 
capitalize on the main outcomes of this research by increas-
ing their inﬂ uence on the legislative process and outcome. 
The research offers policy implications in three direc-
tions. First, it reveals what variables have the highest impact 
on the legislative outcome. Second, it comes up with novel 
insights into which stage of the legislative process – Com-
mittee, Plenary or Council – plays the key role in CAP the 
decision-making. Finally, yet importantly, testing the ﬁ t of 
the experience-based model highlights how much we can 
describe the CAP legislative process with currently available 
observable and measurable factors.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: First, we 
present hypotheses, based on a literature review. Second, 
the database is described and the methodology applied to 
examine it. Third, results are presented. Finally, the paper 
concludes.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were derived, based on an ex-
amination of the related pre-existing literature:
H1: Speciﬁ c legal-institutional factors increase the 
probability of the adoption of EP amendments in the 
COMAGRI
The hypothesis is based on the ﬁ ndings of Tsebelis and 
Kalandrakis (1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004), 
and Kardasheva (2009). They ﬁ nd that the probability of 
the adoption of EP amendments is higher in the case of ﬁ rst 
reading amendments (Tsebelis and Kalandrakis, 1999; Lu-
cic, 2004), amendments supported by the European Com-
mission (Tsebelis et al., 2001) and amendments tabled under 
urgent procedure (Kardasheva, 2009) compared to amend-
ments tabled as second readings, amendments not having 
the backing of the European Commission, as well as amend-
ments in non-urgent procedures.
Yordanova (2009) states that from all the Members of 
COMAGRI, party coordinators are more powerful in the 
European Parliament. Tsebelis (1995) states that the power-
ful members within each EP committee are the chairmen, 
rapporteurs and party coordinators. This conclusion is con-
ﬁ rmed by William (2013) regarding committee leaders, and 
Hageman (2009) and Hurka et al. (2014) regarding chairs, 
vice-chairs and party coordinators. The key legislative role 
of party coordinators is also conﬁ rmed by Kaeding and Ob-
holzer (2012). 
Kreppel (1999) argues that more important and weighty 
– in her words “policy” – amendments are less likely to be 
adopted. Lucic (2004) also states that the probability of the 
adoption of non-policy, less important amendments is high-
er. In contrast, Fertő and Kovács (2014) argue that the adop-
tion rate of weighty, policy amendments is higher than the 
average adoption rate.
H2: Speciﬁ c characteristics of MEPs whose table 
amendments can decrease the probability of the adop-
tion of these amendments by COMAGRI
Sigalas (2010) ﬁ nd that the age of the MEPs is signiﬁ -
cantly negatively correlated with the activity of MEPs in 
terms of parliamentary questions and plenary speeches. He 
also highlights that the gender of MEPs does not explain 
their legislative activity.
Yordanova (2009) and Hurka et al. (2014) ﬁ nd that MEPs 
are more powerful if they have served previously on the same 
EP committee. Mamadouh and Raunio (2003) also conclude 
that representatives in their ﬁ rst mandate produce relatively 
few legislative reports.
Other papers emphasize that both seniority and gender 
(namely, being female) are positively and signiﬁ cantly cor-
related to rapporteur assignments, indicating the greater 
inﬂ uence of individuals with such characteristics in the EP 
(Yordanova, 2009; William, 2013).
H3: Speciﬁ c characteristics of MEP’s Member States 
affect the probability of the adoption of amendments, 
both in EP plenaries and in the Council
Sigalas (2010) ﬁ nd that MEPs from the central countries 
of the EU – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom – are more ac-
tive during the roll-call votes in the EP plenary compared to 
MEPs from peripheral countries. Kovács (2014) concluded 
that the probability of adoption of amendments tabled by 
MEPs from net contributor Member States is higher.
Regarding rapporteurship assignments, Hurka and Kaed-
ing (2012) ﬁ nd that the MEPs from the EU-12 Member 
States are underrepresented compared to EU-15 Member 
States. Similarly, Kaeding and Obholzer (2012) and Hurka 
et al. (2014) argue that MEPs from accession countries have 
less chance of being rapporteurs of committee reports. Ho-
kovsky (2012) highlights that new Member State MEPs are 
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underrepresented in terms of leadership positions, rappor-
teurships, and in key parliamentary activities such as tabling 
amendments and putting forward parliamentary questions.
H4: Speciﬁ c characteristics of EP amendments in-
crease the probability of their adoption in COMAGRI
Some papers highlight that the probability of adoption 
is higher in case of compromise amendments (Shackleton, 
2000), as well as recital amendments (Kreppel, 1999). Krep-
pel (1999) also ﬁ nds that less important amendments are ad-
opted more often. She argues that recital amendments are 
less controversial, and, given that they are legally not bind-
ing, they could be considered less important with a higher 
likelihood of being adopted. Finke (2012) ﬁ nd that rappor-
teurs have a dominant role at the stage of amendment pro-
posal, suggesting that amendments drafted by rapporteurs in 
the draft report might be more likely to be successful. 
H5: Political factors of the decision-making proce-
dures of the EP affect the probability of the adoption of 
amendments at all three levels of decision-making (i.e. 
COMAGRI, EP plenary, Council)
Previous articles have conﬁ rmed that the probability of 
the adoption of EP amendments is higher in the case that 
there is EP unity behind the amendment (Kreppel, 1999) 
and/or when the amendment is supported by the European 
Commission, or if the EP manages to link its opinion to co-
decision proposals (Kardasheva, 2009).
Related to the intra-EP legislative power of the MEPs, 
Hoyland (2006) ﬁ nd that MEPs whose parties are incumbent 
in national government are more likely to be rapporteurs of 
co-decision reports than those of national opposition parties. 
This is related to the ‘Samegov’ variable used in this paper. 
In a context related to how our ‘Large EP’ variable was 
employed, Hoyland (2006) ﬁ nd that ‘Partysize’ variable is 
positively associated with the number of allocated co-deci-
sion reports. Hurka et al. (2014) ﬁ nd that it is more likely 
that the legislative reports will be allocated to members of 
the EPP group for rapporteurship.
Kaeding (2005), and Mamadouh and Raunio (2003), 
state that the two largest EP Groups – EPP and PSE – are 
overrepresented in terms of report allocation in the EP, sug-
gesting the greater legislative inﬂ uence of these two groups. 
Hix and Hoyland (2013) claim that in more than 70% of 
the roll-call votes grand coalitions play a role. Therefore, in 
most of the cases of successfully adopted amendments, there 
exists a People’s Party – Socialist coalition. Hix et al. (2003) 
also reveal that the EPP and PES jointly exercise dominant 
power in the EP and collude to prevent smaller groups from 
securing inﬂ uence. 
H6: There is a positive relationship between the 
COMAGRI adoption and the EP plenary adoption of 
amendments
Fertő and Kovács (2014) ﬁ nd that the EP plenary adopted 
practically all – more than 90% – of the amendments sup-
ported previously by the COMAGRI in the 2013 CAP re-
form.
Data and Methodology
This paper analyses the amendments tabled to the four 
legislative proposals of the 2013 CAP reform. The dataset 
contains 8,614 legislative amendments. Table 1 shows the 
distribution of amendments by legislative instrument. Ma-
jority of the amendments were tabled to legislative propos-
als on Single Common Market Organisations, followed in 
number by Direct Payment Regulation and Rural Develop-
ment Regulation. These amendments were all tabled to the 
legislative proposals between December 2011 and January 
2013, before the EP’s responsible committee vote. A total 
of 193 Members of the EP made amendments to these four 
legislative instruments.
In order to analyse the impact of explanatory variables 
in terms of MEPs and their Member States, joint EP amend-
ments – amendments tabled by multiple MEPs – were ex-
tracted into a binary coded dataset. It means that variables 
are coded using the same number of lines in the dataset as 
the number of MEPs who jointly tabled the amendment (i.e. 
in the dataset one row contains the binary coded variables of 
one MEP). After extraction of joint amendments, the dataset 
contained 16,637 rows. The use of binary and ordinal depen-
Table 1. Legislative instruments and number of EP amendments analysed
Common Agricultural Policy Regulation Co-decision procedure 2014-2020
Legislative instruments Number of EP amendments
Direct Payment Regulation Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 2,575
EAFRD Regulation Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 2,471
SCMO Regulation Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 2,596
Horizontal Regulation Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 972
Total 8,614
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dent variables in structural equation modelling is supported 
by Muthén (1979, 1984) and Arbuckle (2013).
We have limited knowledge about the factors which in-
ﬂ uence EU decision-making, including the adoption of EU 
legislative instruments, the interrelations among these fac-
tors, or their impact on ﬁ nal legislative outcomes. The objec-
tive of the use of structural equation modelling is to better 
understand the decision-making processes of the EU, with a 
focus on the European Parliament, and identifying the fac-
tors that inﬂ uence political decisions and political-legislative 
outcomes. The main research question is what factors – or 
clusters of factors – inﬂ uence EU decisions, and how. In our 
case, this concerns the adoption of EP legislative amend-
ments. In order to test our hypotheses, a following structural 
equation model is deﬁ ned. In the ﬁ rst step we deﬁ ne the vari-
ables for the model.
We deﬁ ne ﬁ ve latent variables. The legal-institutional 
latent variable incorporates the explanatory variables con-
nected to the CAP legislative proposals, as well as to CO-
MAGRI membership. Second latent variable is used for the 
explanatory variables connected to Member States, for the 
type of the amendment, for the personal characteristics of 
the MEP, as well as for the political afﬁ liation of the MEP.
In internal EP decision-making there are three levels at 
which the institution either adopts or rejects EP amendments. 
Decisions about legislative amendments – including draft re-
ports, open, OGC and compromise amendments – are ﬁ rst 
made in the COMAGRI. In the second phase, the EP ple-
nary votes on the COMAGRI-adopted amendments. Finally, 
a decision is made by the Council about those amendments 
adopted by the EP plenary (following trilogue negotiations). 
The dependent variables reﬂ ect these three decision-making 
phases (Table 3).
The relationships among the latent variables, as well as 
their connections with the resulting variables, are deﬁ ned in 
Table 4.
Regarding the relationships among the result variables, 
we can assume the existence of a one-directional relationship 
from the COMAGRI to the EP Plenary, and also from the EP 
Plenary to the Council.
The path diagram (Fig. 1) shows that latent explanato-
ry variables form three separate spheres: 1) ‘Sphere of the 
MEP’ contains the latent variables connected to the MEPs 
and their Member States; 2) ‘Sphere of content’ contains the 
latent variables about the characteristics of the amendment; 
3) ‘Institutional-political sphere’ contains the legal, institu-
tional and political factors.
Based on the path diagram and the relationships between 
the latent result variables and the latent explanatory vari-
ables, the structural equations may be derived as follows:
Table 2. Explanatory variables in the SEM model
Name Abbreviation Meaning
X1 CAP The amendment was tabled to either the 1st or the 2nd pillar of the CAP. The 1st pillar is Direct Payment 
and SCMO. The 2nd pillar is EAFRD.
X2 Member The amendment was tabled by any member or substitute member of COMAGRI.
X3 Net contributor MSs The amendment was tabled by an MEP from a net contributor Member State .
X4 Agricultural MSs The amendment was tabled by an MEP from an agricultural Member State.
X5 EU-15 MSs The amendment was tabled by an MEP from an EU-15 Member State.
X6 Constituency The amendment was tabled by an MEP from a Member State which delegates its representatives to the 
European Parliament on a constituency basis.
X7 Recital The amendment was tabled to the Recital part of the legislative proposal.
X8 Draft report The amendment was tabled by the Rapporteur.
X9 Joint The amendment was tabled by multiple MEPs.
X10 Compromise The amendment was adopted in the form of a compromise amendment.
X11 Multiple terms The amendment was tabled by an MEP in at least their second EP-term.
X12 Male The amendment was tabled by a male MEP.
X13 Large EP Group The amendment was tabled by an MEP who is either a member of the EPP or the S&D Group in the EP.
X14 Same government The amendment was tabled by an MEP whose political afﬁ liation is the same as the government in their 
Member State (i.e. the Minister from their Member State in the Council has the same political afﬁ liation).
Table 3. Dependent variables in the model
Code Abbre-
viation
Meaning
Y1 η1 The amendment was adopted by COMAGRI
Y2 η2 The amendment was adopted by the EP plenary
Y3 η3 The amendment was adopted by the Council
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Table 4. Relationships among latent variables in the model
Parameter Description of the relationship
γ11 Regarding the COMAGRI vote on amendments, it is considered important if the MEP is either a Member or the Substitute 
Member of the COMAGRI, and also, to which CAP legislative proposal the amendment was speciﬁ cally tabled. (At the EP 
plenary stage, the legislative proposals are treated – and therefore voted on – in the manner of a package).
γ22 National delegations in the EP usually form their positions before the EP plenary votes (this happens less frequently than 
before votes in the Committee)
γ23 In the Council, national interests play the greatest role.
γ31 The type of amendment – especially in the case of draft reports and compromise amendments – is an important factor before 
the COMAGRI vote. In the EP plenary, these amendments are only considered as COMAGRI-supported amendments.
γ41 Personal characteristics – especially the number of EP terms – are important at the most personal level of decision-making; 
i.e. at the COMAGRI level, where personal prestige can also impact the adoption of legislative amendments (and very often, 
voting results are also close). In the plenary vote, with more than 750 MEPs, personal characteristics play a much less signiﬁ -
cant role.
Γ51 Party afﬁ liation largely determines the outcome of the voting at COMAGRI level: before the vote, working groups of EP 
Groups decide on the voting list; i.e., on which amendments they adopt and which ones they reject.
γ52 Party afﬁ liation also determines voting at the EP plenary: before the plenary vote, EP Groups decide on the voting list; i.e., 
on which amendments they will adopt and which ones they will reject.
γ53 The same political afﬁ liation of an MEP and Minister of the MEP’s Member State – a participant in the Council – makes 
cooperation between the MEP and the Minister easier.
Fig. 1. SEM model path diagram
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η1 = γ11ξ1 + γ31ξ3 + γ31ξ3 + γ31ξ3 + ζ1;
η2 = γ22ξ2 + γ52ξ5 + ζ2 + β1η1;
η3 = γ23ξ2 + γ53ξ5 + ζ3 + β1η1,
where ξ denotes the latent independent variable, β denotes 
the latent dependent variable, η denotes the relationship 
between the result variables, γ denotes the relationship be-
tween the latent explanatory and latent result variables and ζ 
denotes the measurement error of the endogenous manifest 
variables. 
The relationships between the observed and the latent 
explanatory variables, and the measurement model, are as 
follows:
Χ1 = λ
Χ
1ξ1 + δ1, Χ2 = λ
Χ
2ξ2 + δ2, Χ3 = λ
Χ
3ξ3 + δ3, Χ4 = λ
Χ
4ξ4 + δ4;
Χ5 = λ
Χ
5ξ5 + δ5, Χ6 = λ
Χ
6ξ6 + δ6, Χ7 = λ
Χ
7ξ7 + δ7, Χ8 = λ
Χ
8ξ8 + δ8;
Χ9 = λ
Χ
9ξ9 + δ9, Χ10 = λ
Χ
10ξ10 + δ10, Χ11 = λ
Χ
11ξ11 + δ11;
Χ12 = λ
Χ
12ξ12 + δ12, Χ13 = λ
Χ
13ξ13 + δ13, Χ14 = λ
Χ
14ξ14 + δ14, 
where X denotes the independent variables, δ denotes the 
residual term of the exogenous latent variable and λ de-
notes the factor weight of the endogenous manifest vari-
ables.
The observed result variables is as follows: 
Υ1 = λ
Υ
1η1 + ε1, Υ2 = λ
Υ
2η2 + ε2, Υ3 = λ
Υ
3η3 + ε3, 
where Υ is the observed dependent variable and ε is the mea-
surement error of the endogenous manifest variables. 
Results and Discussion
First, we present a correlation matrix of the variables is 
provided (Fig. 2). The polychoric correlation coefﬁ cient is a 
measure of association for variables. Figure 2 displays the 
polychoric correlations of pairwise variables, and indicates 
how the variables in one latent variable of the SEM model 
are correlated.
Fig. 3 illustrates the standardized parameter estimates. 
The model ﬁ t is very weak. The value of NFI is only 0.007, 
and RMSEA 0.706, while RFI is -0.047. This means that the 
relationships and clustering of the observed and latent vari-
ables, as well as the latent explanatory and result variables, 
are not in line with the preliminary model which was drawn 
up based on the author’s experience and relevant theory. 
Consequently, interpretation of the results should be treated 
with care.1
1The p-value of the model is 0 to three decimal places, in spite of the weak model ﬁ t. Nevertheless, with this sample size the sampling 
variation is so small and the tests are so powerful that even the smallest difference could be signiﬁ cant.
Fig. 2. Polychoric correlation matrix 
of model variables
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The results of the model show that the value for the pa-
rameter between the legal-institutional latent explanatory 
variable and the COMAGRI latent result variable is 0.06. 
The positive value of this parameter – although minor – 
conﬁ rms H1, and the ﬁ ndings of Tsebelis and Kalandrakis 
(1999), Tsebelis et al. (2001), Lucic (2004) and Kardasheva 
(2009); namely, that legal-institutional factors increase the 
probability of adoption of EP legislative amendments. The 
positive impact of legal-institutional variables slightly con-
ﬁ rms the ﬁ ndings of Tsebelis (1995), Yordanova (2009), 
Hageman (2009), William (2013), Hurka et al. (2014) in 
terms of committee membership, as well as Kreppel (1999) 
and Lucic (2004) in terms of the importance of legislative 
amendments. 
H2 claims that certain factors related to the MEP decrease 
the probability of adoption in COMAGRI. The parameter 
value of the relationship between the Member and the EP 
Committee latent variables is 0, indicating a lack of explana-
tory power, so H2 may be rejected. The lack of impact of 
personal characteristics contradicts research by Yordanova 
(2009), Sigalas (2010), Hurka et al. (2014), Mamadouh and 
Raunio (2003) and William (2013). 
According to H3, all four factors connected to the Mem-
ber State of the MEP increase the probability of the adop-
tion of EP amendments, both at EP plenary and Council 
level. The value for the relationship between the ‘Member 
State’ and ‘EP plenary adoption’ latent variables is 0.01, and 
that for the ‘Member State’ and ‘Council adoption’ is 0.11. 
Though to a very limited extent, these results conﬁ rm H3 
at both levels of decision-making (EP plenary and Council), 
and thereby agree with the ﬁ ndings of Sigalas (2010) and 
Kovács (2014). The results also corroborate the ﬁ ndings of 
Hurka and Kaeding (2012), Hokovsky (2012), and Kaeding 
and Obholzer (2012) regarding EU-15 Member States. Our 
ﬁ ndings are in line with Kaeding (2004), Mamadouh and 
Raunio (2003) concerning the net contribution of Member 
States. We can conclude that Member State-related factors 
have impact on the adoption of amendments in the Council.
Figure 3. SEM model of 2013 CAP reform in the European Parliament
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H4 implies that amendment-related factors have a posi-
tive effect on the adoption of the amendments in the CO-
MAGRI. The parameter value for the relationship between 
the ‘Amendment’ and ‘COMAGRI adopted’ latent variables 
is 0.56, thereby conﬁ rming H4. This result is in line with 
the conclusions of Shackleton (2000) regarding compromise 
amendments.
H5 states that political factors increase the probability of 
adoption of EP amendments at all three levels of decision-
making. The parameter value for the relationship between 
the ‘Political factors’ latent variable with the ‘COMAGRI 
adopted’ latent variable is 0.12, -0.15 with the ‘EP plenary’ 
latent variable and 0.61 with the ‘Council adoption’ latent 
variable. This identiﬁ cation of a positive relationship with ﬁ -
nal adoption conﬁ rms H5. It is important to note that political 
factors have the strongest impact on the decision-making in 
the Council, which shows the signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence of MEPs 
whose political afﬁ liation is the same as that of their respec-
tive national governments. These results conﬁ rm the ﬁ ndings 
of Kreppel (1999), Hoyland (2006) and Kardasheva (2009).
H6 suggests that the adoption of EP amendments by CO-
MAGRI positively inﬂ uences their adoption in the EP ple-
nary. The parameter value of the relationship between these 
two latent result variables – in line with the conclusions of 
Fertő and Kovács (2014) – is 0.68; accordingly, H6 may be 
adopted.
Conclusions
The legislative role and inﬂ uence of the European Parlia-
ment has attracted signiﬁ cant scientiﬁ c attention, especially 
since the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. We analyse 
the decision-making procedures of the European Parliament 
during 2013 CAP reform employing a novel dataset.
Our results show that three latent explanatory variables 
have impact on the adoption of EP legislative amendments. 
Both the ‘Member State’ and ‘Politics’ latent variables have 
an impact on decision-making in the Council. This ﬁ nding 
conﬁ rms our a priori expectations given that the Council is 
composed of delegates of Member States and the ‘Politics’ 
latent variable contains the ‘Same government’ variable 
which indicates a link exists between the EP and the Coun-
cil based on same party afﬁ liation. Moreover, the ‘Amend-
ment’ latent variable indicates that the type of amendment 
has a key impact on its adoption in the COMAGRI. Notice, 
however, that the type of amendment is closely interlinked 
with the MEP who proposes it in some cases: draft and com-
promise amendments, are tabled by the rapporteurs of the 
legislative ﬁ les. This reﬂ ects the key role of rapporteurs in 
the legislative process.
Finally, the weak ﬁ t of the model refers to the fact that 
legislation and its outcome is inﬂ uenced by factors – ob-
served and latent – that were not investigated in the research 
described in this article. These variables are most probably 
non-observable or non-measurable. One of our main conclu-
sions is that most of the observable and quantiﬁ able factors 
have minimal inﬂ uence on the intra-EP legislative process of 
the 2013 CAP reform. Nevertheless, it is also important and 
valuable to know which factors, contrary to experts’ expec-
tations, have no or minimal impact on the legislative proce-
dure and outcome.
Our research provides some policy implications. First, 
COMAGRI is the most important body in the decision-mak-
ing phase. It is the backbone of legislation; its position is 
dominantly adopted at the two latter decision-making phas-
es. Second, the type of amendment is more important than 
the characteristics of the sponsoring MEP. Finally, the na-
tionality of a sponsoring MEP is relevant not only in the EP, 
but also when entering into negotiations with the Council. It 
implies that informal relations between MEPs and Council 
members or ofﬁ cials along national lines have a clear impact 
on the ﬁ nal adoption of an EP amendment.
Further studies should focus on extending the number of 
explanatory variables in the analysis, as well as investigating 
the policy content of amendments. This article might trigger 
further research and efforts to collect, quantify and analyse 
further data on the legislative process of the European Union. 
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